perience within such a system because legislation does not always result in the intended consequences. For example, rather than reducing lost time from industrial accidents, comprehensive compensation provisions may, in fact, have the opposite effect. Since compensation becomes the acci dent victim's entitlement and right, there may be an increase in the number of accidents reported and/or the duration of time off resulting from an accident. If the legislation results in this behavior, the economic burden on the employer is greater and this shift may, in turn, cause the employer to reduce prevention program initiation and/or compliance. In this case, the number of accidents may go up and the out come is opposite the original intent of the legislation to reduce suffering.
Obviously, employers are a critical link in implementing and financing the provisions of health and safety compensa tion legislation. Thus, one must determine to what extent health and safety legislative provisions influence manage ment's perceptions concerning employee behavior and their subsequent decisionmaking in the health and safety area. Do employers perceive that the provisions facilitate or hinder organizational health and safety activities? Do the legislative provisions shift a greater economic burden onto the employer because employee behavior changes? Are other in stitutions or groups more influential than the government in the firm's administration of health and safety programs?
The answers to these questions obviously have both management and public policy implications. Management's response within the context of multiple external pressures will affect future legislation as it is modified to achieve the intent of the original law and vice versa. Understanding the influence exerted by other factors, including other firms, unions, employee groups, and other government rules and regulations, will also provide insight into the most effective implementation approaches. Not only the government but the employers themselves may be able to use these groups to cooperatively improve health and safety records. This paper examines employer perceptions and behavior in response to New Zealand's comprehensive accident compen sation legislation. In the first section the background of the Accident Compensation Act is briefly reviewed, followed by a discussion of the provisions of the legislation. Provisions for levy rates and incentive rebates under the Safety Incen tive Scheme are outlined. The second section examines the current data on industrial accidents in New Zealand, highlighting the data on seven high-risk industries. The third section then outlines the methodology used in collecting survey data on management's perceptions and responses within these high risk industries. The data are reported and, finally, conclusions are drawn.
New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act
Prior to the 1972 Accident Compensation Act, New Zealand's personal injury remedies under the law were fragmented and generally considered insufficient.
• A victim was entitled to a limited form of compensation payable under workers' compensation legislation but only if the accident or disease arose out of work and in the course of employment.
• A victim could claim damages in the Courts if negligence on the part of some other person could be established.
• A victim could draw on funds administered by the Crimes Compensation Tribunal if the injury was caused by the criminal acts of others.
• A victim could receive social security1 if none of the above remedies was available.
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• Owners of motor vehicles were required under the Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1928 to insure against death or injury liability (Fahy 1982) .
The litigation and inequitable treatment resulting from this fault-based approach (i.e., that an action in law for damages arising out of personal injury or death could only be sustained if negligence on the part of the defendent was proven or admitted) ultimately led to a Royal Commission of Inquiry on Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand report in December 1967 (the Woodhouse Report)2 and passage of the Accident Compensation Act (ACA) in 1972. The 1972 Act and its Amendments were supplanted by the Accident Compensation Act of 1982 which became effec tive April 1, 1983. The 1982 Act did not alter the concept of the system but rather simplified previous complex wording and improved administrative provisions (Fahy 1983 ).
The Royal Commission set down several principles upon which the legislation rests:
• Community responsibility;
• Comprehensive entitlement;
• Complete rehabilitation, which would be encouraged by an award not being revisable downward after an initial assessment;
• Real compensation (adequate benefits); and
• Administrative efficiency (Royal Commission 1967) .
The purpose of the Accident Compensation Act is thus to provide accident prevention, compensation, and rehabilita tion for every man and woman, and protection 24 hours a day. The compensation itself is governed by the personal cir cumstances of the accident victim. If there is a loss of earn ings or a loss of earning power, the compensation payable under the accident compensation scheme is related to that loss of earnings and earning power. Rehabilitation assistance is also tailored to meet the actual and continuing needs of the accident victim, so the nonearner is covered in this way (Inglis 1982) .
To insure this coverage, three schemes have been im plemented: An Earners' Scheme for employed or selfemployed persons, a Motor Vehicle Scheme for persons in jured in accidents involving motor vehicles, and a Sup plementary Scheme for persons not covered under the first two schemes, including homemakers and visitors to New Zealand (Dahl 1976) . Broadly, the Earners' Fund and the Motor Vehicle Fund are independently financed and selfsupporting, and each is charged with all amounts paid in claims which arise under the respective schemes. 3 The Sup plementary Fund is financed from money appropriated for that purpose by Parliament.
Employer's Contributions
Since the focus of this paper is on employer costs and fac tors influencing their behavior, it is important to examine the Earners' Fund, which is financed by levies on employers and self-employed persons. Through this fund employers finance the earnings-based compensation which is paid to employees who suffer an injury, whether or not such injury arises in the course of employment. The levy paid by the employer is paid at a rate specified for that particular industry activity classification or classifications. All industry, trade, business and professional activities are classified so that the amount of levy collected for each class and the amount of compensa tion, medical expenses, and other payments provided can be recorded. Work accident accounts are kept by industrial ac tivity classification. A separate nonwork accident account is kept and the costs (compensation, medical expenses and 352 Compensation in New Zealand other payments) are spread equally over all industrial ac tivities. It should be noted that industrial activity refers to the employer, not the occupation of the employee. Thus, the nature of the goods produced or services rendered deter mines the industrial activity under which the leviable earn ings of the employees are classified. The levy rate per $100 of wages ranges from $.50 for the provision of actuarial ser vices, the practice of accountancy, the services of ad ministrative agencies, clerical, management activity, etc. to $5.00 for mining underground, exploring, prospecting and development works (natural gas, minerals, oil) in, on, or above the continental shelf, and tunneling (Accident Com pensation Corporation 1983). While higher rates are set for more dangerous activities by the ACC Board, there is not a strict multiplicative relationship between the degree of danger and the levy. In other words, as evidenced in the in jury rate (see tables 2 and 3) mining is more than 10 times more dangerous than actuarial services. To some extent then, "safe" activities subsidize more dangerous activities.
The Accident Compensation Act does fix a maximum amount of individual earnings on which the levy is payable. The Accident Compensation Order of 1981 (S. 1981/338) raised this maximum to $39,0004 applicable to payments due May 31, 1983. Prior to this, the maximum amount of in dividual earnings on which the levy was payable was $18,720. The leviable earnings include wages and salaries, overtime pay, holiday pay, piecework payments, longservice leave pay, bonuses or gratuities, gross commissions, honoraria and allowances for boarding, lodging or housing.
The Earners' Fund gross levy revenue ($149,317,624) made up 62 percent of the total income ($242,388,617) received by the Accident Compensation Corporation for the year ending March 31, 1982. At this time there was a credit balance of $218.2 million in the Earners' Fund, but forecasts indicated that the fund would be inadequate to meet the long term run-off of claims in years ahead. The shortfall was $62.7 million (Fahy 1982 In addition to paying levies into the Earners' Fund, an employer is also responsible for directly compensating employees 100 percent of their earnings on the day of the ac cident and during the following six days if the employee is unable to work because of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment (ACA& 112). Effective April 1,1983, the employer's first week compensation liability also in cludes any overtime the employee would have worked (Fahy 1983) . In practical terms, this means the employer must pay the employee the full amount he/she would have received had he/she been working. In 1982 it was reported that the cost of this first week's compensation still averaged about 10 cents per $100 of the leviable payroll (Fahy 1982, p. 32) . If the earner is incapacitated for more than seven days the Commission pays the compensation regardless of whether or not the accident arose out of and in the course of employment5 (ACA & 113).
Safety Incentive Scheme
The Safety Incentive Scheme rewards those employers whose work-related accident records are significantly better than other employers paying the same industrial activity levy. This is not a no-claims bonus system, but rather is bas ed on actual performance relative to expected performance. In other words, an employer with a perfect record (no ac cidents for which claims are filed in the period) does not necessarily receive a bonus. If the employer is engaged in low accident activities, no claims would be expected. A signifi cant improvement is thus more likely from employers engag ed in activities where the accident rate is expected to be high. 
Accident Rate Data
It is logical to hypothesize that the first week provisions and the Safety Incentive Scheme would provide the employer with an incentive to actively seek health and safety im provements and reduce the accident frequency rate. Unfor tunately, it is not possible to make valid comparisons be-tween data published preceding and following the passage of the Accident Compensation Act. Unlike current provisions, claims made under the old Workers' Compensation Act, for example, included first-week incapacities but excluded in juries to the self-employed (notably farmers). Injuries receiv ed traveling to and from work were also not included in previous statistics but are now deemed to be "work-related." These last two factors are significant con tributors to the "fatalities" now recorded. The exclusion of the first-week incapacity also means that injury frequency and severity statistics are not compiled as in the past (Acci dent Compenstion Corporation 1982). As shown in tables 2 and 3, an "injury rate" is currently calculated based on the number of compensated accidents per 1000 workers, which does allow comparisons across industries and occupational groups, however.
The industry data in table 2 shows that while the injury rate averages 35 for all industries, it ranges from 86 for min ing and quarrying to 5 for finance, insurance, real estate and business services. Manufacturing had the second highest in jury rate in 1981, 60, with a total 18,672 compensated ac cidents. More than one-third of all compensation paid went to manufacturing workers. The highest number of fatalities, 44, was in forestry and fishing but this industry did not have the highest accident rate (compensated claims per 1000 workers) as previously discussed.
By occupation group, the highest injury rate and number of fatalities were recorded for transport equipment operators and laborers as shown in table 3. This occupational group also received nearly two-thirds of the compensation paid in 1981, $21.2 million. Forest workers, fishermen and hunters had the second highest injury rate, 43, with 45 fatalities. Compensation paid to this occupational group totaled only $5.1 million, however. 
Employer Decisionmaking
Given the universal coverage of the Accident Compensa tion Act, the levy system, the employer's responsibility for compensation during the first week, and the presence of an incentive scheme, it is important to examine the employer's response to this legislative initiative. Specifically, four ques tions need to be addressed:
• To what extent does the availability of accident compen sation and government legislation, in general, influence management's response to health and safety compared to other factors such as the union, other firms, employee concerns, and other government rules and regulations?
• To what extent do employers believe that the provisions of the AC A change employee behavior? That is, does the existence of compensation prolong the absence of injured workers, or are more accidents reported as a result of the compensation?
• To what extent do employers believe that their expen ditures in the health and safety area are offset by lower accident rates?
• To what extent are the influencing factors and the employer's cost benefit assessment correlated with ac tual accident behavior in the organization?
The answers to these questions are all related to one another. In terms of cost considerations, price competition and the employment relationship, the employer is going to be influenced by other firms in the industry, government rules and regulations (as distinct from compensation provisions), unions, and other employee groups. Employee behavior can be expected to be influenced by the benefits provided through the government's accident compensation legislation. This behavior will in turn affect the employment relation ship. The interactive relationship between these factors is shown in figure 1 . As suggested in the questions above, it is hypothesized that factors influencing an employer's reaction do not have a direct impact; this influence is instead filtered through the employer's overall assessment of the costs and benefits of health and safety activities. This relationship is illustrated in figure 2 . With respect to costs, economic theory suggests that organizations assume a proprietary strategy and seek to max imize their return. This classical assumption about economic self-interest does not automatically prescribe a particular treatment of health and safety within the organization, however. On one hand, the employer driven to minimize costs has no incentive to invest in safety programs, machine safeguards, new selection procedures, etc. Accident preven tion has explicit costs which can be avoided. On the other hand, accidents themselves are an expense. Accidents may involve disrupted production, damaged equipment, lowered morale resulting in overall lower productivity, compensation payments, recruiting and selection replacement costs, and the payment of wage differentials. The employer may thus choose to invest in accident prevention because "the benefits derived from the safety expenditure are costs which are not incurred" (Berkowitz 1979, p. 53) . Certainly some invest ment in health and safety is economically rational, and it is assumed that these expenditures will have an impact on the organization's accident record.
Methodology
In order to assess the impact of New Zealand's accident compensation provisions in the context of other factors in fluencing an employer's cost benefit assessment and accident record, intensive information was collected within seven in dustries, including forestry, pulp and paper, construction, steel, rubber, oil exploration, and chemicals. The distribu tion of firms between industries was balanced, and within each industry the number of foreign-owned versus domestic firms was also balanced. Data were collected from 19 cor porations, as well as from their respective plant operations, for a total of 38 organizations. Eighteen of these organiza tions were foreign-owned. Six were headquartered in Australia, six in Britain, two in the U.S., two in Holland and two in Japan. Twenty of the surveyed organizations were domestic enterprises. Two-to three-hour structured interviews were conducted with the corporate president or chair of the board and/or the senior executive responsible for health and safety within the organization. A second copy of the questionnaire was sent to the general manager of one of the organization's operating facilities. This questionnaire was returned directly to the in vestigator. Employers responded to detailed questions on organization structure and behavior, and perceptions of fac tors influencing health and safety administration. Health and safety performance was measured by the level of ac cidents. Employer response was measured by the hierarchical level of the position of the individual charged with primary responsibility for health and safety, and the percent of this individual's time spent on health and safety issues. Percep tual questions about influential factors, union relations, etc., were measured on a 7-point scale.
Results
It has been suggested that multiple factors moderate the effect of legislation on management's behavior and their perceptions of this effect. Across the industries sampled, government rules and regulations and the provisions of acci dent compensation legislation were reported as having a very high influence on health and safety decisionmaking within the firm. The mean influence rating for each of these factors was X = 5.21 and X = 3.77, respectively, as shown in table 4. Evaluated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all influenced, 7 = influenced to a great extent), employers also reported be ing influenced by employee concerns and demands (X=4.08) and to a slightly lesser extent, the union in the plant (X=3.52). Employers did not indicate that employee turn over (X=1.79) had an impact on the decisionmaking. The impact of other firms in the industry (X = 2.78) was also low. This may be explained, however, by the fact that when employers were asked to compare themselves with other firms in the industry, the mean response was X = 5.49, with 7 indicating that they believed they placed much more em phasis on health and safety than did other firms. An analysis of these influential factors by industry, as shown in table 5, revealed that government rules and regula tions were most important across all industries. In both rub ber and forestry, the accident compensation and the govern ment rules and regulations were linked as the top two in fluential factors. In the remaining industries, employee con cerns and demands constituted the second most important factor. The oil and chemical industries indicated that other firms in the industry was the third most important factor in fluencing their health and safety decisionmaking, while the other industries, steel, construction, pulp and paper and rub ber, rated the union as being the third most influential factor in their respective industries. The mean response in forestry indicated that employee concerns and demands was the third most important factor in that industry. In order to assess the nature of this perceived influence, the question was asked whether the influence exerted by these factors was positive or negative. In other words, did the managers believe that other firms, the union, employees, etc., facilitated or hindered their efforts in the area of health and safety administration. Certainly it would be possible for one of these factors to be exerting a great deal of influence, but in a counterproductive fashion. In fact, in no case did the 34 employers respond that these factors hindered their health and safety efforts. With the exception of the response to government rules and regulations (X=5.49), employers viewed these factors as fairly neutral, that is, neither facilitating nor hindering their health and safety efforts. The mean ratings on the other factors were between X = 3.64 for employee turnover and X = 4.97 for employee concerns.
Cost-Benefit Assessment
Obviously one or two factors, whether internal or external to the organization, will not in and of themselves change an employer's behavior with respect to health and safety decisionmaking. These factors interact with each other and organizational factors such as the amount of time spent on health and safety and the position level of the individual with primary responsibility for health and safety within the organization. The employer then considers these aspects and screens their impact in the context of the economic return to the organization.
As previously discussed, legislation affects not only employer compliance behavior but also employee behavior, which in turn has an economic impact on the firm. One reservation about the accident compensation legislation, for example, is the fear that the system will be abused. If employees view the provisions as benefits to which they are entitled, which in fact they are, more accidents which the employee would previously have simply worked through may be reported. It is also possible that the employee will be absent from work longer with a given accident because he or she is receiving compensation. In fact, when the employers were asked, "To what extent do you believe that more ac cidents are reported as ajesult of accident compensation?," the mean response was X = 5.31, with 1 indicating "not at all" and 7 indicating "to a great extent." The mean response to the question, "To what extent does the existence of acci dent compensation prolong the absence of injured workers," was also high (X= 5.00).
In order to assess the overall economic impact of accident compensation legislation and other influential factors, employers were asked "To what extent do you believe that your expenditures in the health and safety area are offset by your accident rates?" The perception of worker's absence, given the presence of a compensation system, was not significantly correlated with this overall cost-benefit assess ment, but was significantly correlated with beliefs about the number of accidents reported. The greater the extent to which employers felt more accidents were reported, the less likely they felt that their costs in the health and safety area were offset by the benefits. As shown in table 6, the overall assessments of the influence of accident compensation legislation and government rules and regulations were not significantly correlated with the employer's cost-benefit analysis. Other factors influencing health and safety decisionmaking which are significantly correlated with the employer's cost-benefit assessment include the union and employee turnover.
Organizational characteristics which were positively cor related with the manager's cost-benefit analysis at a significance level less than .05 included the size of the cor poration measured in terms of number of full-time 366 Compensation in New Zealand employees (r= .28 p< .05). If the firm was headquartered in New Zealand, the employer was also more likely to feel that the costs were offset by the benefits or lower accident rates (r=.27p<.05). 
Influencing Factors, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Accident Record
The impact of legislation and other factors is important not only in terms of the degree of influence on decisionmaking and the employer's subjective assessment of the costs and benefits. More significant is the relationship between these elements and actual accident behavior in the organization. Given the number of factors influencing health and safety outcomes, is accident compensation correlated with lower accident rates, or is the direct effect erased by the economic impact of unintended consequences, i.e., more accidents be ing reported and longer absences by those who claim com pensation? Table 7 shows that accident compensation legislation, as a factor influencing employer decisionmaking, is positively correlated with the accident rate (r= .33 p< .05). This find ing may simply reflect the fact that the more accidents in an organization, the more likely it will have transactions with the Accident Compensation Corporation. The relationship between government rules and regulations and the accident rate in 1982 was significant and in the expected direction (r = -.39 p<.05). The greater the reported influence of the government, the lower the accident rate. Another external factor significantly correlated with the accident rate was the influence of the national union (r = .55 p < .05). The relation ship is not in the expected direction. The coefficient indicates that the national union influence was stronger in those organizations with higher accident rates. As an internal influencing factor, employee turnover (r=.29 p<.10) was positively correlated with the accident rate in 1982. In other words, the greater the influence of employee turnover, the higher was the accident level and vice versa. Other organizational structural variables which were significantly correlated with the level of accidents in 1982 in cluded the locus of ownership and the position level of the person given primary responsibility for health and safety. The locus of ownership variable revealed that New Zealand organizations were more likely than foreign-owned organiza tions to have accidents (r = -.34 p<.05). The position level of the individual primarily responsible for health and safety also indicated that for the organizations sampled, the higher this assignment, the higher the number of accidents (r = -.25 p<.10).
Conclusion
Accident compensation legislation does not always result in intended consequences. Survey research conducted in 38 organizations shows that the New Zealand Accident Com pensation Act is not, in and of itself, perceived as a major in fluence on employers' health and safety decisionmaking. Government rules and regulations are a major influence, however, along with employee concerns and demands and the plant union.
The impact of the accident compensation legislation is evi dent in employers' assessments of resultant employee behavior and their own subsequent cost-benefit analyses of health and safety expenditures within the organization. Employers reported that they believe more accidents are now reported as a result of accident compensation (X = 5.31 on a 7-point scale) and that the existence of accident compensa tion prolongs the absence of injured workers (X = 5.00 on a 7-point scale). The employer's overall assessment of the costs and benefits of health and safety activities within their organization was significantly correlated with the employers' beliefs about the number of accidents reported, but not with the employers' beliefs about extended absences. This finding supports the notion that the overall benefits derived from comprehensive compensation provisions outweigh the cost. Despite the belief that more accidents may be reported, employers felt that their expenditures in the health and safety area (including the first week compensation requirement) are offset by lower accident rates.
Further evidence of the impact of accident compensation legislation is found in the significant correlation between the influence of this legislation and the level of accidents in the firm. Government rules and regulations and national unions were also significantly related to the number of accidents reported in 1982.
The policy implications of the findings reported here are that government agencies and the Accident Compensation Corporation may be able to strengthen their influence on health and safety in the firm even further, through increased cooperation with the unions. The data show that this effort would be best directed toward the individual plant union organization rather than the national federations. The find ings further indicate that efforts to help employers address employee concerns should also prove useful. Across all in dustries, employers reported a high level of influence exerted by perceived employee concerns and demands. An example of such an involvement would be facilitating policy formula tion, such as the New Zealand Employers Federation policy statement on health and safety in the workplace adopted in 1983 ("NZEF Adopts Policy" 1983).
From the employer's perspective, the finding that the stronger the union influence on health and safety decisionmaking the more likely the employer reported that the benefits outweighed the costs in health and safety ad ministration, suggests that employers may also find it useful to strengthen the union's role in this area. A second recom mendation, which fits with working more closely with the workers, is to place management responsibility for health an'i safety administration at lower levels within the organiza tion. This suggestion flows from the finding that the higher the assignment of responsibility for health and safety within the organization, the higher the level of accidents. A third recommendation is that employers may find it useful to work with other firms on resolving health and safety problems. The majority of firms reported that they believed that they placed more emphasis on health and safety than did other firms. This suggests that organizations may be able to learn from one another. The unions may also be able to provide a mechanism for this linkage.
NOTES
1. Under Part 1 of the Social Security Act of 1964, injured persons able to qualify under the relevant means test had modest monetary benefits, and all New Zealand residents normally had access to medical, hospital and other related benefits under Part 2 of the Act (Fahy 1982) .
2. The Woodhouse Report characterized the adversarial fault system as being cumbersome, erratic, and extravagant in operation. The negligence action was labeled a lottery producing an adequate indemnity for only a relatively small group of injured persons.
3. Prior to the revisions effective in the Accident Compensation Act 1982, the Earners' Fund was charged with all amounts on claims where workers suffered injury in motor vehicle accidents in New Zealand aris ing out of and in the course of the injured person's employment. Now all compensation resulting from motor vehicle accidents is financed through levies on vehicle owners.
4. New Zealand dollars are reported. The NZ/US exchange rate was ap proximately $.64 (NZ) per $1.00 (US) as of April 1984.
Compensation in New Zealand 371 5. For the individual, the legislation stipulates that the earnings related compensation for all periods of incapacity extending beyond the first week is calculated by reference to the amount of "relevant earnings" (ACA & 104) . In December 1978, the limit on relevant earnings deter mined under S. 104 was removed, however. Instead a limit was placed on the amount of weekly compensation paid. In December 1981, the max imum amount of earnings-related compensation was increased from $288 per week to $600 per week. The ACC may at its discretion fix a minimum amount of earnings for the self-employed, and for the period March 1983 to March 1984 this minimum was set at $12,324 or $2377week. Earnings-related compensation may in general be paid until a claimant reaches the age of 65 years, but where the injured earner is over 60 special provisions apply.
